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Mexico’s economy began a process of economic liberalization 
in the 1980s that continued through the 90s, highlighted by the 
implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). These neoliberal policies have contributed to the 
further marginalization of Mexico’s rural communities by 
making them dependent on foreign markets and placing their 
livelihood and wellbeing in the hands of foreign investors who 
favor deregulation, privatization, proletarian disunity, and low 
wages. The narcoeconomy represents to many members of 
these marginalized rural communities an alternative, and often 
more attainable, model of success. Michoacán has been hit 
heavily by neoliberal reforms and has concurrently seen an 
increase in cartel activity, whereas Chiapas, a region marked 
by its resistance to neoliberal incursion, has proven resistant 
to cartel influence. This corollary relationship is examined 
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Introduction  
 In the past three decades Mexico’s economy has been liberalized 
through a series of political reforms that arose out of economic crises, 
disturbing the protectionist policies that Mexico had for decades 
implemented, to generalized success, in order to industrialize and provide 
services for the middle- and working-class members of society. These 
neoliberal reforms have resulted in the gutting of social welfare provision, a 
decrease in the quality of democracy, and the further marginalization of rural 
communities. Mexico has seen an increase in poverty, income inequality, and 
unemployment and stagnant wages despite being promised prosperity by 
those who pushed for the implementation of neoliberal reforms, accepted 
under duress during a period of economic upheaval.  
 Violent drug cartels have only seen an increase in both their power 
and their rivalry since the turn of the century. The military conflict initiated 
during the presidency of Felipe Calderón shows no signs of stopping, and a 
report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies has placed Mexico 
second on the list of the world’s most violent countries in 2016, behind only 
Syria.1 Despite current president Enrique Peña Nieto’s promises to 
deescalate the conflict, rates of violence in 2016 rivaled those of 2011, the 
year many consider to be the “peak” of Mexico’s drug war. What we are 
seeing instead of de-escalation is a waning and waxing conflict with no end in 
sight – evidence that the current approach is ineffective. 
                                                        
1 Source: http://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2017-adeb/may-
8636/mexico-murder-rate-9f41  
Neoliberalism and Cartel Ascendancy in Rural Mexico 5 
The narcoeconomy, though present throughout much of Mexico’s 
history, has seen its influence explode since the implementation of these 
policies. This is because it is an alternative economic model for self-
sufficiency, especially appealing in the context of a society that has adopted 
neoliberal policies that marginalize and alienate the poorest sectors of that 
society. I argue that there is a causative relationship between the degree to 
which a rural community in Mexico is resistant to neoliberal exploitation and 
the influence of the cartels in that region. The examples of Michoacán and 
Chiapas will be used, the former of which has seen an explosion in 
narcoeconomy influence and has for decades been pushed aside by the 
policies of the federal government, and the latter, which has been vocal and 
vehemently opposed to neoliberalism and rather than turn to the 
narcoeconomy as an alternative, has constructed its own system of local 
government and representative democracy. 
 
Neoliberalism in Mexico: A Review of the Literature 
 Neoliberalism is best defined as the resurgence of 19th and 20th 
century economic practices of economic liberalization. These policies and 
practices “… range from conservative fiscal and monetary policies (cuts in 
government spending, tax reform, tight money supply and high interest 
rates) to domestic price liberalization, deregulation, capital market opening, 
privatization and trade liberalization” (Thacker, 1999, p. 59). The ultimate 
goal is, at least ostensibly, to decrease government involvement in the 
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private sector based on the premise that regulation curtails growth. The 
proponents of neoliberal policies tend to be those big business interests who 
have the most to gain from them. Privatization and deregulation in Mexico, 
for instance, provide capitalists in the United States with an incentive to do 
business there because they can pay their employees less than they might in 
the United States; they won’t have to worry about provision of retirement 
plans or healthcare, and they won’t have to adhere to the same (often 
restrictive) labor policies; all of these factors have the potential to increase 
profits and domestic capital. 
 Unfortunately, this tends to create a race to the bottom effect. 
Capitalists benefit from the disunity of the working class, because increased 
unemployment and competition propagate low wages and maximize 
corporate profits. Resultantly there is a constant search for locales without 
significant unionization or other entities that pursue worker’s rights. Should 
the working class organize to demand higher wages and better treatment the 
interests of the capitalist class would require that they relocate to another 
zone, or else find a way to combat this unification. In this way neoliberalism 
is fundamentally exploitative; it seeks to pay workers less while extracting 
more and avoiding pesky regulation and unionization. It is often forced upon 
developing countries by organizations like the IMF and World Bank, 
organizations in which “developed” countries have overwhelming say, as a 
condition for receiving aid or debt restructuring. Kurt Weyland notes that 
this reform is fundamentally undemocratic because “it involves the forceful 
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dismantling of the established development model, and may therefore 
require a significant concentration of political power” (Weyland, 2004, p. 
136). 
 A fundamental shift has occurred in Mexico since the 1970s; 
specifically, neoliberal reform has not only occurred but has been promoted 
and propagated by politicians by way of what Adam Morton, borrowing from 
Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci, calls a passive revolution. This describes 
the situation in which a state restructures existing institutions in response to 
an internal or international crisis or public discontent; in this process power 
remains in the hands of the bourgeoisie but conditions within the state 
transform (Morton, 2003, p. 636). One major contribution to the scholarly 
work on Mexico’s neoliberal reform is his detailing of the series of economic 
crises that occurred in Mexico in the second half of the 20th century leading 
up to neoliberal reform, including peso devaluation, IMF austerity programs, 
and an oil-dependency that caused economic strife. Importantly, he explains 
the shift that occurred during this period by which, “Ministries associated 
with banking and finance planning provided the career experience likely to 
lead to the upper echelons of government” (Morton, 2003, p. 638). This set 
the stage for neoliberal reforms that would come as a result of the alignment 
of the interests of big business and finance with those of the state, and 
corroborates Thacker’s analysis of the NAFTA negotiations and the ways in 
which they were influenced by Mexican big business elites. Mexico’s 
Neoliberalism and Cartel Ascendancy in Rural Mexico 8 
impoverished masses were not considered during this period of reform nor 
were they represented in negotiations or political proceedings. 
By the 2006 elections public discontent with neoliberal reform had 
continued to grow, “motivated by high unemployment, low wages, and 
privatization of strategic public enterprises” (Béjar and Breña, 2006, p. 17). It 
was clear that the great successes promised to the public were overstated, 
and civil unrest ran rampant in the form of organized protests by teachers, 
laborers, and others responding to the government’s inability to properly 
subsidize and support necessary industries (Béjar and Breña, 2006, p. 19). 
Jon Shefner also writes of the role of civil society in opposing neoliberal 
reform and notes that class needs to be emphasized in analysis of neoliberal 
reform in Mexico. This is because it “has exacerbated class divisions in Latin 
America,” and, as noted by many other scholars of neoliberalism in Latin 
America, it has decreased the quality of democracy by providing only “a very 
limited spectrum of political possibilities” (Shefner, 2007, p. 188). 
Importantly, according to Shefner, Mexico’s peasant class is at the center of 
this civil unrest because it is the faction of society most affected by 
diminished wages, high costs of living, unemployment, and a lack of social 
services; this has contributed to patterns of migration to the United States 
and Mexico’s large cities, which in turn increases discontent among workers 
who perceive these economic migrants as a threat to their livelihood 
(Shefner, 2006, p. 194). Indigenous populations are especially 
underrepresented and tend to occupy the lower rungs of Mexico’s 
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socioeconomic hierarchy. The communities of Michoacán and Chiapas, 
27.69% and 36.15% indigenous respectively, are no exception to this trend 
(Mexico: Data and Statistics, 2017). 
Attempts to limit the quality of democracy by maintaining executive 
power, providing the illusion of choice, and increasing judicial power despite 
controversial decisions not supported by the public were also a feature of 
this era. Béjar pits true representative democracy against neoliberalism, 
contending that both cannot exist simultaneously, which consequently 
explains the attempts by the existing political order to reduce the quality of 
democracy in order to maintain the status quo of neoliberal economics (Béjar 
and Breña, 2006). 
While these scholars link neoliberal reform to increases in 
unemployment, stagnant wages, migration, degraded democracy, lack of 
social services, and high cost of living, they tend to mention cartels only to 
exemplify the general chaos of certain sectors of Mexican society. I contend 
that these factors, produced or exacerbated by neoliberal reform, directly 
contribute to the rise of the cartels because they represent the inability of the 
state to provide its citizens with necessary support. This increases 
desperation and poverty, which contributes to cartel ascendancy due to the 
narcoeconomy’s ability to create jobs in otherwise destitute conditions. 
Existing literature on México’s narcoeconomy highlights its persistence in 
spite of a militarized response, and points to systemic causes of the 
narcoeconomy’s prevalence. During the period of neoliberal reform the state 
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withdrew from areas that were heavily dependent on its support, and the 
narcoeconomy, spearheaded by violent cartels, swept in to fill the vacuum 
that was left (Maldonado Aranda, 2013). Small towns have popped up or 
stayed afloat in Michoacán and across México thanks to narco money, and 
these communities are often dependent on the narcoeconomy to the point 
where inadvertent participation can be unavoidable (McDonald, 2009). 
Rather than treat neoliberal reform as incidental to these changes in Mexico, 
I seek to strengthen the argument for a causative relationship between 
neoliberal reform and drug cartel influence in Mexico through the use of the 
cases of Michoacán and Chiapas to provide a greater and a more concrete 
base of evidence for a causative link. 
 
Neoliberalism in Mexico 
 Before the mid-1980s Mexico’s economy abided by the tenets of 
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), a sort of protectionist economic 
policy wherein domestically produced goods are substituted for foreign 
imports to increase independence. Many industries were nationalized and 
protective tariffs were implemented in an effort to be foster self-reliance and 
prosperity. This meant that many industries were subsidized and controlled 
by the federal government, and the state was the major driving force for 
economic development rather than the private sector. Economic crisis and 
international pressure would be the major motivating factors in Mexico’s 
adoption of neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 1990s. The 1980s are often 
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referred to in Latin American parlance as la década perdida, or “the lost 
decade.” This is because during this period many Latin American states 
experienced stagnant or even negative growth, and Mexico was no exception. 
According to the OECD, between 1983 and 1988 Mexico’s GDP increased by 
an average of a mere 0.1% annually, inflation was rampant, debt (especially 
debt owned by the U.S.) was mounting, and unemployment was very high.  
Generally speaking, Mexico’s response was not dissimilar to that of 
other similarly challenged nations: it began negotiations with the U.S. and 
organizations like the IMF to liberalize the economy with the ultimate goal of 
reinvigorating the domestic economy and spurring economic growth, thus 
solving the problems the country faced for years. Agreements like the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT), and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) led Mexico 
to become heavily dependent on exports and foreign (particularly U.S.) 
capital. Between 1993 and 1995 exports rose from 15% to 33.5% as a 
percentage of GDP, and during the same period “the share of manufactures in 
total exports soared from 28 percent to 85 percent” while many existing 
manufacturing firms previously subsidized by the state were rendered 
unable to compete and went bankrupt (Hart-Landsberg, 2002). The state 
rapidly withdrew from various business and public service practices, and 
between 1984 and 1988 the number of government controlled entities and 
firms went from 1,212 to 448 (Hart-Landsberg, 2002). While Mexico saw an 
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improved economy in the early 90s as a result of an influx of foreign capital, 
this ultimately collapsed as the growth proved unsustainable. 
 Undoubtedly the most significant occurrence in this process was the 
implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
which officially went into effect in January 1994 after a long period of 
negotiation between the three prospective adherents, Canada, the United 
States, and Mexico. NAFTA was a way to cement the neoliberal reform that 
had already been taking place in Mexico for years by codifying neoliberal 
trade practices. But who negotiated this deal and whose benefit was taken 
into account when it was drafted? Strom Thacker examined the coalitions 
that were formed in service of implementing economic liberalization in 
Mexico, and ultimately concludes that it was a process of “… inclusion of the 
largest segments of the private sector elite and the exclusion of smaller and 
medium-sized firms” (Thacker, 1999, p. 61) Early processes of liberalization 
resulted in a state that was increasingly tied to big business elites from the 
private sector, and this newfound “mutual trust” as Thacker calls it, had set 
the stage for the involvement of wealthy capitalists in the NAFTA 
negotiations (Thacker, 1999, p. 62). This was in line with the steady 
incorporation of business and finance elites into high levels of Mexican 
government that had been occurring since the late 1970s, and spelled 
disaster for the working class. 
 The Coordinating Council of Foreign Trade Business Organizations 
(COECE) is an offshoot of the Business Coordinating Council (CCE) that was 
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created to represent Mexico’s largest private firms and groups in the 
negotiation process leading up to NAFTA (Thacker, 1999, p. 63). No officials 
critical of NAFTA or its potential effects were present; those most likely to 
benefit from NAFTA were those most frequently consulted. Mexico’s 
government negotiators relied heavily upon the advice of this council during 
their negotiations with Canadian and American policymakers, meeting with 
them in nearby conference rooms before and after negotiations (Thacker, 
1999, p. 64). When a full draft of NAFTA was presented to the COECE they 
“compiled an approximately 50-page document outlining the revisions” they 
desired, around 90% of which were adopted by the policymakers (Thacker, 
1999, p. 69). “Thus the NAFTA negotiations consolidated and formalized a 
powerful policymaking coalition between a small number of outward-
oriented big business elites and Mexican government technocrats” (Thacker, 
1999, p. 72). As such the process of negotiating and implementing NAFTA in 
Mexico is representative of a larger trend of privatization and privileging 
business interests over the interests of the working class.  
 
Neoliberalism and Democracy 
 Both Weyland and Teichman argue that neoliberalism has caused a 
decrease in the quality of democracy in Latin America, and particularly in 
Mexico. They argue that the only reason neoliberal reform was accepted in 
most Latin American countries (including Mexico), is because these countries 
were facing financial crises and the populace was resultantly backed into a 
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corner and forced to accept the reform. Teichman argues, “The community 
development perspective challenges the key tenets of the neoliberal 
viewpoint, making its exclusion from policy development and monitoring 
understandable. However, this exclusion may give rise to increased criticism 
of the responsiveness of democratic institutions to less than efficacious 
policy outcomes” (Teichman, 2009). Essentially, seeing as how neoliberal 
policy is inherently neglectful of community development projects (at least 
publicly funded ones), the system of democracy that has accepted neoliberal 
reform in Mexico has ignored the victims of Mexico’s “opening up.” 
Neoliberal policy has created “assaults on the welfare state” that often trigger 
popular uprising against a state that is perceived to work against the interest 
of its inhabitants (Shefner, 2007, p. 184). This has caused increased 
discontent with Mexico’s state and federal governments on the part of the 
citizenry. Weyland argues that while the quantity of democracy has been 
increased in that more people have access to vote and more candidates are 
available, the quality has diminished as the interests of the most vulnerable 
factions of society are pushed aside (Weyland, 2004). 
 It is in the interest of the ruling elite to limit the quality of a 
democracy because it ensures their ability to remain in power. Mexico’s three 
largest parties, for instance, the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), the Partido 
de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), and the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI) appeal to different factions of Mexican society, but all 
three have ultimately shown their support for neoliberal reforms and 
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practices. One example of this trend is the Pacto por México, spearheaded by 
Enrique Peña Nieto of the PRI and signed in 2012 by representatives of all 
three parties, that outlined among other things further privatization of 
previously nationalized industries like petroleum and telecommunications. 
The PRI, now represented by President Peña Nieto, has come a long way 
from its origins in revolutionary nationalism and social welfare and is now 
more than ever a neoliberal party – evidenced by Peña Nieto’s actions in 
opening the petroleum industry. In this way, the similarities between the 
three parties are more significant than their differences. Regardless of if a 
PRI, PAN, or PRD candidate is elected, neoliberalism survives, and it is in this 
way that the quantity of democracy may be increased as different parties 
successfully compete for political office, but the quality is diminished as the 
choices are not as fundamentally different as they may appear and the will of 
the people is subordinated to the aims of the international political order. 
This occurrence has decreased the quality of democracy by providing only, “a 
very limited spectrum of political possibilities,” (Shefner, 2007, p. 188).  
There are, of course, other parties but none has proven viable enough to be a 
contender in national elections. Like PRI, PRD, and PAN candidates, these 
politicians often shy away from substantive debate and instead focus their 
efforts on campaigns to better their public image (Béjar, 2006, p. 23). As a 
result of public disillusionment with the rhetoric of professional politicians, 
many abstain from voting altogether on the grounds that all politicians are 
equally corrupt. 
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 Neoliberal reform frequently causes a decrease in the quality of 
representative democracy, causing marginalized communities (like rural, 
agrarian communities in Chiapas and Michoacán) to be exploited by big 
business interests and ignored by their representatives. The response in 
Michoacán by rural communities has been to turn to the narcoeconomy as an 
alternative model for upward mobility, and it has been exceedingly insidious: 
“at least 83 of Michoacán’s 113 municipalities are mixed up on some level 
with the narcos” (Wilkinson, 2009). In Chiapas, Zapatista-controlled 
communities have responded to this decrease in the quality of representative 
democracy and attempted neoliberal reform by forming their own 
participatory democratic governments and providing services like 
healthcare, education, protection, and entrepreneurial opportunities. Their 
autonomous zones are, as a result, some of the safest areas of Mexico and 
some of the areas in Mexico least touched by the narcoeconomy, even though 
ostensibly they have all of the necessary elements (poverty, rural character, 
remoteness) to be a breeding ground for such activity. What Zapatista-
controlled Chiapas does not have is the sort of desperation and precarity that 
neoliberal structural adjustment so often brings, as it does in Michoacán. 
 
Research Design: Comparing Chiapas and Michoacán 
 For this research the diverse case method of cross-case selection and 
analysis will be used. This research will be confirmatory in nature because it 
seeks to describe an X/Y relationship, namely that of neoliberal reform and 
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cartel ascendancy in Mexico – the former being the independent variable and 
the latter being the dependent variable. Chiapas and Michoacán are the 
diverse cases used because each has come into contact with the X variable 
(neoliberal reform), but have responded distinctly, causing a discrepancy in 
the incidence of the Y variable (cartel influence) between the two states. Of 
course myriad factors are at play in these cases including cultural differences, 
distinct economic models, and indigenous character among others. My aim is 
to establish a relationship between the incidence of neoliberal structural 
adjustment in two rural communities but to avoid a reductionist analysis 
differences in both cases will be explored. 
 Chiapas and Michoacán are sufficiently similar so as to be compared 
for many reasons, both quantitative and qualitative. First, both have similar 
populations (4.58 million for Michoacán; 5.21 million for Chiapas), the 
population with at least a primary school education is similar (1.66 million 
for Michoacán; 1.88 million for Chiapas), and the economically active 
population of each is remarkably similar (1.87 million for Michoacán; 1.94 
million for Chiapas). They both have a profoundly rural character and 
history, and in 2011 Michoacán had a total sown area of 1,081,740 hectares 
while Chiapas had a total sown area of 1,449,954 hectares. The makeups of 
their state economies are therefore similar in that they are dependent 
primarily on agriculture, however Michoacán relies far more on agriculture 
for export which means that agricultural workers typically do not own the 
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land that they work, whereas in Chiapas smallholder agriculture is more 
prominent. 
 Both Michoacán and Chiapas also have a history of resistance to 
federal government encroachment and resentment toward government 
meddling in local affairs. In Michoacán this is exemplified by ranchero culture 
and the state’s long history of remoteness and independence; the common 
view of the federal government is that it needlessly imposes restrictions 
without providing any significant infrastructure or support for the people of 
the state. In Chiapas the resistance to the federal government has arisen out 
of its indigenous character – the prevalence of a group frequently 
marginalized within Mexican society and attempts by the government to 
implement policy that would further marginalize this group characterize 
Chiapas’ history.  
 Michoacán was chosen as a case representative of medium-sized, 
rural-in-character states in Mexico where cartels have steadily increased 
their power and brutality in recent years. Chiapas was chosen because it is an 
exceptional case of a state that shares key characteristics with Michoacán, 
but has not seen the same rise in drug trafficking, cultivation, and organized 
crime; it is unique in this sense and was thus chosen to be contrasted with 
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Michoacán’s Marginalization and Neoliberal Policy 
Michoacán has a long history of alienation from and resistance to the 
federal government. Structural reforms in Michoacán that began in the 
1940s, attempted to integrate the state by bringing infrastructure to the 
region, but the people of Michoacán still felt on the margins of Mexican 
society. The infrastructure built, including airstrips, highways, and seaports, 
was quickly coopted by drug traffickers, manufacturers, and cultivators. Even 
the poor agrarian laborers planted poppies or marijuana in place of or among 
conventional crops because the model of agricultural production and 
exportation was not sufficient (Maldonado Aranda, 2013). This practice 
continues in Michoacán’s Tierra Caliente region to this day (McDonald, 2009). 
Drug production and trafficking existed in Michoacán prior to 
neoliberal reform, but participation as well as violence increased in the 
1980s first when PRI hegemony was defeated and later beginning in 2006 
when president Felipe Calderón launched a militaristic offensive campaign in 
the Mexican theater of the drug war, beginning with his home state of 
Michoacán. The result was more than 70,000 drug war-related deaths during 
his presidency where from 2000 – 2005 drug-related homicides averaged 
between 3,500 and 4,000 (Teague, 2016), and increased competition 
between cartels whose leaders were frequently subject to prosecution.  
Michoacán’s increased marginalization and precarity is caused in 
grand part by neoliberal policy. The rise of the narcoeconomy in Michoacán, 
though it has deep roots, can be in part attributed to the sense of exploitation 
Neoliberalism and Cartel Ascendancy in Rural Mexico 20 
and political disregard that residents feel the government imposes upon 
them. The narcoeconomy is an alternative model for success in a neoliberal 
landscape that many find appealing, especially disenfranchised laborers and 
agrarian workers whose options for escaping poverty are scarce. 
 Ranchero culture in Michoacán is characterized by distrust of 
government, particularly federal government, and a self-sufficient, self-made 
attitude toward life. Narcos in Michoacán in the latter half of the 20th century 
slowly replaced self-made farmers as the cultural model of success in the 
region and a whole economy sprung up in many small towns bolstered by 
wealthy narcos. Poor, rural residents of Michoacán previously only had a 
couple of options: go to the United States to work and send money home, or 
work for a pittance in agriculture in Mexico, producing goods for foreign 
export (thereby depending upon foreign markets for their livelihood, a staple 
of neoliberalism) with no guarantee of security or benefits by employers or 
the state; the narcoeconomy presented them with a local alternative.  
In a society that valued the model of the self-made man, bemoaned the 
interference of the federal government, and was marginalized by neoliberal 
reforms, the life of a wealthy narco looked appealing. If one was to work 
slavishly to provide products to foreign markets, the job at least ought to pay 
well (McDonald, 2009). Many people even establish themselves as narcos, 
stockpile their money, and then buy themselves farms to fulfill the cultural 
model of the ranchero man; ironically this has driven up the price of land and 
made this model even more unreachable to impoverished workers than it 
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was before (McDonald, 2009). This coopting of local culture by narcos has 
made the narcoeconomy more insidious and more appealing to the have-nots 
of Michoacán. 
 In his examination of what he considers to be a typical town in 
Michoacán, McDonald noted that, “the modified new cultural forms found 
[there] were emerging in a place where local farmers were losing their 
struggle for a decent livelihood in a rapidly globalizing economy” (McDonald, 
2009, p. 7). What’s more, “rural people are being rendered obsolete and are 
displaced in a faltering agrarian economy. This has resulted in widespread 
migration, unemployment, and underemployment among those left behind” 
(McDonald, 2009, p. 7). With an ISI economy domestic products are 
produced and consumed domestically, but with the neoliberal reform of the 
1980s and 90s rural workers became more dependent on foreign exports. He 
concludes, “…broad-based rural decline and poverty continues to create 
fertile conditions for the narcoeconomy to flourish. This, in turn, creates 
further forms of cultural and economic displacement” (McDonald, 2009, p. 7). 
 Maldonado Aranda writes of rural communities’ (specifically those in 
Michoacán) feelings of abandonment after the “implementation of structural 
readjustment policies” in the 1980s and 1990s. He argues, “the State 
abandoned rural regions whose support had been indispensable, despite 
rampant corruption and the prepotency of many government officials. Not 
surprisingly, that vacuum of power and resources was soon filled by illegal 
groups that took advantage of the situation to impose criminal violence, 
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while the State turned to the military and other forces of public security to 
try to deter the juggernaut of transnational drug commerce” (Maldonado 
Aranda, 2013, p. 63). This only exacerbated the disillusionment with federal 
involvement that the people of Michoacán felt, as many were caught in the 
crossfire during militarized responses to cartel activity; communities heavily 
affected sometimes did not know who to fear more, the cartels or the 
government. 
 
Chiapas’ Resistance to Neoliberalism and Cartels 
 Zapatista communities in Chiapas are marked by their resistance to 
neoliberal exploitation, and this resistance has contributed to their ability to 
resist cartel influence in the region. The Ejército Zapatista de Liberación 
Nacional (EZLN) arose in 1994 in response to the enactment of NAFTA, 
which included a provision that called for the cancellation of Article 27 of 
Mexico’s constitution – a contribution of Emiliano Zapata that secured 
indigenous rights to their land and protection from exploitation of natural 
resources by foreign interests. They actively resist federal encroachment in 
their territories and resent attempts to incorporate them into a globalized 
economy at the expense of their sovereignty. 
 Instead of allowing the quality of democracy to diminish in the region 
as so frequently occurred in Latin America with neoliberal reform, the 
Zapatistas established a model of participatory democracy that makes every 
effort to be inclusive and representative, and employs citizens on a rotating 
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basis (Starr et al., 2011). As such, impoverished and marginalized groups 
have a say in matters of local government and do not feel so exploited and 
ignored by the institution as in Michoacán, where distrust of local 
government is rampant. 
 The Zapatistas main effort has been toward preserving the autonomy 
of small, self-sufficient, rural communities. Seeing the extraction and 
exploitation wrought by neoliberal policy in Latin America, the Zapatistas 
decided, “rebuilding the social fabric means keeping the countryside safe for 
those who produce Mexico’s food basket. To this end, [they] have sought to 
guide by example, working to maintain autonomous, self-sufficient 
communities, viable now in a time of worldwide financial crisis that 
inordinately impacts rural regions” (Earle and Simonelli, 2011). This has, so 
far, been their most effective attempt at resisting neoliberal exploitation, a 
rather simple one based on community development and self-sufficiency. 
 To maintain their autonomy and resistance, the Zapatistas actively 
work to ensure that they are not benefiting from or contributing in any way 
to the narcoeconomy. They examine every donation; they close their 
caracoles (local government assemblies) to outsiders and even NGOs; and 
they work to provide opportunities for rural residents to dissuade them from 
participation in the narcoeconomy through their experiments in Zapatilism, a 
sort of entrepreneurial socialist capitalism by which Zapatista leaders invest 
in local projects with the goal of community betterment as well as 
profitability (Earle and Simonelli, 2011). Smallholder agriculture in 
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Michoacán and in Petén, Guatemala just across the river from Chiapas is 
suffering both because of the influx of narco-ranchers, the production of 
drugs, and eviction by landowners who plant lucrative crops like palm oil 
(Earle and Simonelli, 2011, p. 134). In Chiapas, support from the EZLN has 
contributed to the success of smallholder agriculture and made 
encroachment by wealthy landowners and narcos less prevalent. 
 
Comparison  
 The two regions will be compared based on three criteria: 
employment opportunities and conditions, incidence of violent crime, and 
emigration. Employment opportunities, or lack thereof come as a result of 
economic policy (thus it is related to neoliberal reform), violent crime and 
homicide are inextricably linked to cartel activity, and emigration is 
frequently caused both by structural adjustment and concern for safety. 
Comparing both locales in terms of employment and wages can be a 
bit tricky since one of the major features of Zapatista-controlled zones of 
Chiapas is the emphasis on smallholder agriculture, in contrast with 
Michoacán’s dominant model of large-scale agriculture for export. Even 
considering the difference in economic models between the two states, the 
unemployment rate in Chiapas as of 2013 was 3.08%, compared with a rate 
of 4.23% in Michoacán for the same year (Mexico: Data and Statistics, 2017). 
Additionally wages in Chiapas were 1.3x higher than those in Michoacán for 
the year 2011 (Mexico: Data and Statistics, 2017). These metrics for labor and 
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economic prosperity display a trend of consistently higher employment and 
wages in Chiapas over the last 25 years as Michoacán has been gutted by a 
series of neoliberal reforms and Chiapas has held on by empowering the 
impoverished and practicing smallholder agriculture for the local benefit—a 
microcosmic version of the ISI economy that Mexico once had in that locally 
produced goods are predominantly consumed locally. 
 Although imperfect, attempts to fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal 
of federal support as a result of neoliberal policy in Zapatista-controlled 
zones of Chiapas have resulted in a certain degree of stability and security 
when compared with other similar states. For instance, Michoacán in 2011 
had a homicide rate that accounted for 27.4% of violent deaths, while the 
figure for Chiapas was only 8.7% (Mexico: Data and Statistics, 2017). The 
vacuum in Michoacán was filled by cartels like La Familia Michoacana and 
Los Caballeros Templarios, who became more brutal and competitive when 
the militarized federal crackdown on cartels began in 2006 after Felipe 
Calderón took office. The Zapatistas are keenly aware of the threat that 
cartels and the narcoeconomy pose, particularly along the Mexican-
Guatemalan border. However, Chiapas remains a very safe area of Mexico 
and Earle and Simonelli maintain that “this relative safety in the midst of 
national drug wars is no coincidence, as the Zapatistas have always been 
antidrug and anti-alcohol, making it difficult for narcotraficantes to function 
within their relatively vast boundaries” (Earle and Simonelli, 2011, p. 137). 
This is in part a result of the EZLN and other local non-governmental police 
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forces in the state, formed because “even in Chiapas, the safest state in the 
nation, rampant distrust of army and police alike has pushed non-Zapatista 
communities to form expanded paramilitary ‘neighborhood watch’ units” 
(Earle and Simonelli, 2011, p. 138). Those not living in Zapatista-controlled 
zones and therefore not able to receive protection from the EZLN have 
established similar methods of policing their communities, their practices no 
doubt a result of Zapatista influence. 
According to the Norway-based Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Center (IDMC), as of 2015 some 287,000 people have been displaced in 
Mexico as a result of the drug war and violence perpetrated by both the 
military and warring cartels2. Mass displacement has occurred in Michoacán, 
as in 2011 when over 2,000 people were displaced as a result of a violent 
conflict between La Familia and Los Caballeros Templarios3. However, 
perhaps more significant than incidents of mass displacement are the 
conditions that lead families to leave one at a time, including conditions of 
generalized violence, lack of jobs, and non-viability of smallholder agriculture 
as a result of narco encroachment via drug cultivation, driving up the cost of 
living and property, and violent tactics. 
Emigration can be an indicator of the conditions in the homeland as 
emigrants seek better wages, improved living conditions, and safety. 
International migrant workers are also a feature of Mexico’s economy, and 
remittances from the U.S. came to $27 billion USD in 2016. In 1995 
                                                        
2 Source: http://internal-displacement.org/database/country/?iso3=MEX 
3 ibid 
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remittances only amounted to $3.6 billion USD, but since the 1990s, 
economic instability, unavailability of jobs, and stagnant wages have caused 
many to go north in search of better-compensated work to support 
themselves and their families4. Though Chiapas’ population is larger than 
that of Michoacán, the number of international migrants is much smaller 
both by number (21,797 to 85,175) and by percentage (0.42% to 1.85%) in 
2010 (Mexico: Data and Statistics, 2017). This indicates a more significant 
need to emigrate in search of either work or safety in Michoacán, and could 
be explained both by Michoacán’s high rates of violent crime as well as lack 
of adequate jobs.  
 In Zapatista-controlled areas of Chiapas infrastructure has been 
established to meet the needs of the inhabitants that the government has 
proven unwilling to or incapable of providing for. This contrasts with 
Michoacán, whose only similar venture is the construction or growth of 
pueblos that are supported by the narcoeconomy, though not directly 
involved in it. This occurs when wealthy narcos establish themselves in small 
towns and due to their wealth the local economy is bolstered (McDonald, 
2009). The narcoeconomy “has a huge multiplier effect in the vast array of 
other jobs it generates both directly (e.g., transportation, security, banking, 
and communication) and indirectly (e.g., construction, the service sector, and 
spin-off businesses)” (McDonald, 2009, p. 7). McDonald observed this 
occurrence in a small town of around 10,000 in the mountains of Michoacán. 
                                                        
4 Source: http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/20/news/economy/mexico-remittances-trump/ 
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Although this practice causes some to look favorably upon narcos as 
supporters of community projects, the support is uneven and often comes at 
great cost to the safety and security of the locale. It provides a new model 
and some new opportunities for economic achievement, but also exacerbates 
inequality as the poor people of Michoacán’s small towns compete for 
opportunities to participate in this new economy and the cost of land and 
goods is driven up by the presence of the narcos (McDonald, 2009). 
 The penury that has resulted from neoliberal reform increased 
distrust of the federal government on the part of Mexico’s working poor. 
Dissatisfaction with having little input in the decisions that would determine 
the trajectory of their lives created ripe conditions for non-governmental 
groups to garner their support; both the EZLN and Michoacán’s various 
cartels fall into this category. The former, however, attempted to address 
systemic issues that contribute to cartel ascendancy like lack of education, 
extreme poverty, and lack of representative democracy. They improved 
“socially horrific conditions” by protecting their communities, and providing 
“a viable social system of agricultural production and marketing, continually 
available healthcare in remote regions, enlightened education for children, 
and the responsive village governance” (Earle and Simonelli, 2011, p. 136). In 
Michoacán, meanwhile, cartels merely capitalized on the destitution and 
provided to some a dangerous but lucrative opportunity to leave poverty 
behind; this has also occurred in Sinaloa, Durango, Chihuahua, Morelos, 
Guerrero and other states in Mexico. It is the government’s inability to 
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address systemic issues that makes cartels so ineradicable and the neoliberal 
reform that has occurred in the last 30+ years is the main factor that has 
caused or worsened these systemic issues. As such, the Zapatistas approach 
has proven more effective than militarism and more equitable for the 
populace than the narcoeconomy.  
 
Conclusion 
 The poor conditions for the working class in Mexico’s rural 
communities that have resulted from neoliberal policy create the breeding 
ground for cartel influence, and given certain other factors like local culture 
and attitudes toward government this is what has occurred in Michoacán. It 
should be noted that this is not the only potential response, but the two 
phenomena are correlatively linked and the evidence available suggests a 
causative relationship. In Chiapas, attempts to liberalize the state’s economy 
were met with resistance by the Zapatistas, whose response has been 
uniquely indigenous in character – something that should not be overlooked 
since it serves as a rallying point for local groups and is a factor not so 
present in Michoacán’s response to neoliberal reform. McDonald wrote of the 
dominant ranchero culture in Michoacán that is both racial and cultural and 
tends to erase indigenous identity in the region (McDonald, 2009). The 
culture of each state has been a major factor in its response, and so while 
neoliberal policy marginalizes rural communities, response varies according 
to cultural and societal factors. 
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Neoliberal policy has fallen far short of what its proponents promised 
to the Mexican people, who were skeptical from the outset, but accepted the 
changes because they were sold as inevitable and absolutely necessary. In 
the years since this policy went into effect rural communities in Mexico saw 
little positive change and nearly all have experienced increased 
marginalization as the state aligned with business interests and cut social 
welfare services and regulation of industry. Rural communities are further 
disenfranchised by the poor quality of democracy in Mexico, which offers 
them no viable candidate who will represent their interests. These 
communities had only a few options in responding to the dire situation; they 
could travel to large cities or to the United States in search of better-paying 
jobs, they could resist neoliberalism and fight for self-sufficiency via 
smallholder agriculture as in the case of the Zapatistas in Chiapas, or they 
could turn to the narcoeconomy as an alternative, but still capitalist and 
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